Energy Bangla

On the 24th of September Rosatom Will Put in Commission the First Power Unit of “Bushehr” NPP. Construction of the two-unit NPP with a total capacity of 2,460 MWt under the project of the Siemens/KWU concern was launched at the “Bushehr” side in the mid-seventies.
The 1979 revolution in Iran resulted in overthrow of the monarchy and assumption of power by religious administration under the leadership of ayatollah Khomeini. In 1980 German government terminated the contract with the Iranian client and joined the American embargo upon supply of technological equipment to Iran.
At that time concern Siemens/KWU completed 85% of the construction works on the first unit and 70% on the second one, and it also assembled 70% of auxiliary equipment for the first unit. German contractor did not manage to supply the main equipment (reactors, turbines and generators) to the NPP.
Islamic Republic of Iran attempted to restore the nuclear power programme in 1991 by concluding a bilateral agreement with China for supply of two units with the power of 300 MWt under the Chinese project, however this agreement did not receive any further development.
On the 8th of January 1995 a contract between Russia and Iran was signed providing finalising of construction of unit No. 1 of “Bushehr” NPP with reactor WMWC-1000 with a mandatory condition to use the infrastructure already present on site for this project.
According to Addendum No. 1 to Contract of 29/08/1998 the Russian party had undertaken finalising of construction of the power unit No 1 of the “Bushehr” NPP under the turnkey approach and condition of training of Iranian exploitation personnel (in total there were 34 Addendums to the Contract for supply and carrying out of the works signed before the beginning of 2003).
In September of 2013 the power unit “Bushehr-1” was given the nominal power and the process of commission was started.
The significance of the project for Rosatom lies within the following. First, the Russian party realised the “turnkey” project regarding all its peculiarities and requirements of the client. The limitations of the project were related to both the climate conditions of the position of the NNP and the political atmosphere around Iran. Despite all of the above, the Russian contractor – the merged company NIAEP-ASE – had fully and within set terms fulfilled its obligations by strengthening of reputation of a reliable and predictable counteragent.
Realisation of the project within the set terms witnesses a great potential of the Russian contractor in the field of forming effective and international project groups capable to implement construction of the NPP and pass on the skills of safe operation of the object to the local specialists.
Secondly, during realisation of the project the equipment of one supplier (Rosatom) had to be inscribed into the existing construction of another supplier (Siemens), which was a real challenge for Russian nuclear engineering. The most advanced engineering solutions were involved in realisation of the “Bushehr” project including technology of project management Multi-D, assuming modelling of NNP operation using the maximum number of variables, from physical to economic quantities.
Third, construction of the NPP in Iran widened the competences of the merged company NIAEP-ASE in the field of realisation of the project in the region of Central Asia. From now on the efficiency of Russian technologies is proved by the operation of the NPP in all climate zones.
Fourth, construction of the “Bushehr” NNP proved the sovereign right of every country to construct a NPP on its territory according to the international norms and rules in effect. “Bushehr” NPP is a nuclear power installation and does not have a double purpose. It functions in accordance to all the norms of international and national law. Meanwhile Iran’s development of infrastructure for uranium enrichment is a subject of interest of the world society and IAEA. Russia being a full-fledged member of the IAEA, fully shares the efforts of the agency to ensure control of the Iranian nuclear programme.
Fifth, realisation of the “Bushehr” project forced Rosatom to introduce effective solutions to access to processes of uranium enrichment of the countries willing to develop nuclear energy on the national level. This refers to the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) created in 2007 on the base of the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Complex (AECC). This is a joint-stock company granting its owners the right to manufacture the enriched product on the Russian platform under a strict supervision of IAEA. Another function of IUEC is provision of guaranteed stock of low-enriched uranium to its shareholders, which makes the operation of their nuclear and industrial complexes transparent and predictable. As of today the shareholders of IUEC are Russian, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Another important direction for ensuring safety and the norms of non-disclosure became the issue of fuel supply to the “Bushehr” NPP. Rosatom assumed all the related risks committing to supply of fresh nuclear fuel to Iran and export of the spent fuel while maintaining control over the dangerous radiation zones of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Sixth, Russia and Iran expressed interest in continuing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and industry, and began negotiations on finishing construction of the second power unit of “Bushehr” NPP.